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REIMBURSEMENT OF HUSBAND FOR FUNERAL
EXPENSES OUT OF SEPARATE ESTATE OF
DECEASED WIFE
JOSEPH WITMER*

T

HE question as to whether the husband can ever subject the separate estate of the wife to liability for any expenditures made by
him in fulfilment of his duty as such under the common law is not a
novel one. This question has been raised frequently in cases where the
husband sought reimbursement from the separate estate of his deceased
wife for expenses incurred by him on account of her last illness and
for her burial.
As a general rule, at common law, the husband was primarily liable
for the expenses of his wife's last illness and for the funeral expenses
of his deceased wife regardless of whether she had a separate estate or
not. But although at common law neither the wife nor her estate were
held legally liable for the expenses of her last illness or for her funeral
expenses, courts empowered to administer her estate on equitable principles generally have allowed such expenses and other debts as well
against her separate estate where the husband had failed to pay on account of poverty, or, being insolvent, payment from him or his estate
could not be enforced. 1
Modern statutes such as Sections 246.02 and 246.03, Wisconsin Statutes, 1925, have given to a married woman the exclusive use and ownership of her separate property, free from any claim or the control of the
husband, and, on the other hand, have provided that a married woman
shall hold such separate estate free from any charges on account of the
debts and obligations of her husband. In view of these statutes the
question has arisen as to the effect upon the common law liability of
the husband for funeral expenses and other charges of statutes such as
Section 313.16, Wisconsin Statutes, 1925, providing for the order of
paynent of claims against any estate and giving preference to the
funeral expenses and then to the expenses of the last illness over all
* Member of the Wisconsin Bar from Appleton.
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other debts against the estate. The weight of authority seems to be that
statutes like Section 313.J6, supra, make the funeral expenses a primary charge upon and enforceable against the estate of the wife irrespective of the duty of the husbasd to pay therefor and without regard to his financial ability to pay them.2 Some courts so hold the
separate estate primarily liable irrespective of any statute or the
common law duty of the husband.'
The majority of the courts holding the estate primarily liable were
influenced by the Massachusetts case of Constantinides v. Walsh,4 in
which the decision was largely placed on the ground that the statutes of
that state had granted to married women the exclusive use and control
of their separate property wholly independent from any claim or control
of the husband and consequently enlarged the liabilities of their estates,
so that if the statutes providing that the estates of deceased persons
shall be liable for the funeral expenses are to be applied to estates of
married women, the estate became primarily liable. However, nearly
all of these courts have refused to extend the application of statutes
similar to Section 313.16, supra, so as to make the medical expenses of
the last illness of the wife a primary charge against her separate estate
where the husband was solvent and could pay them. This conclusion
was reached on the theory that while the funeral expenses are presumably incurred on the credit of the state,5 the medical attendance and
other services for the wife are incurred on the credit of the husband
and therefore are to be considered his individual debt. 6
But although the estate of a deceased wife is primarily liable, does
the husband become secondarily liable?
At common law a husband, of course, could not have such reimbursement for the payment of funeral expenses and expenses of last illness of
'Schneider v. Breier's Estate, 129 Wis. 446, lO9 N.W. 99, 6 L.R1A. (N.S.) 917;
Constantinides v. Walsh, 146 Mass. 281, I5 N.E. 631; Moulton v. Smith, 16 R. I.
126, 12 At. 891; Rocap v. Blackwell, (Ind.) 137 N.E. 726; Smith v. Eichner, 124
Wash. 575, 215 P. 27; Stonsifer v. Shriver, Ioo Md. 24, 59 Atl. 139; In re Skillman's Estate, 146 Iowa 6oi, 125 N.W. 343; Text in I3 R.C.L. 1213; 30 CJ. P.
922,. et seq.

Contra: Hall v. Stewart, (Va.) i16 S.E. 469.
'McClellan v. Filson, 44 Ohio 184, 5 N.E. 861; Hatton v. Cimninlgham, 162
N.Y. Supp. loo8.
" Supra.

Estate of Kelley, 183 Wis. 485, 19o N.W. 280.
'Hayes v. Gill, 226 Mass. 388, 115 N.E. 492; Moulton V. Smith, i6 R.I. 126,
12 Atl. 891; Stonsifer v. Shriver, 1oo Md. 24, 59 Atl. 139; see also In re Stadtunller, 96 N.Y. Supp. xiOl.
Contra: In re Skillnan's Estate, 146 Ia. 6oi, 325 N.W. 343, (influenced by a
local statute making family expenses chargeable upon the property both of the
husband and wife); Smith v. Eichner, 124 Wash. 575, 215 P. 27; McClellan v.
Filson, 44 Ohio 184, 5 N.E. 861.
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his deceased wife, and only where a married woman by her will expressly charged her separate estate with the payment of her funeral
expenses, could the husband become entitled to reimbursement from
7
such estate in case he had paid such charges.
The courts, however, which have held that the separate estate of the
wife is primarily liable under the statutes for the funeral expenses of
the wife, are not in accord on the question of whether a husband, who
has paid such funeral expenses, can have reimbursement from her separate estate.
Some of these courts have held that as between the estate of a married woman and her husband the estate must, under the statute, be regarded as primarily liable, and although it is the husband's duty as before to see that his wife is buried, yet if he pays her funeral expenses,
he is entitled to recover his reasonable expenditures from her separate
estate, as in other cases, when a person has paid, in pursuance of a
legal duty, what, as between himself and another, that other was bound
to pay."
Other jurisdictions, which have likewise held that the funeral expenses are a primary charge upon her estate, have denied that the effect of so holding was to make the husband as between himself and the
separate estate of his deceased wife secondarily liable. They hold that
the husband as before remains primarily liable, that the modern statutes must not be regarded as enlarging the liabilities of her estate but
merely enabling the creditor to proceed against the wife's estate in the
first instance without regard to the ability or willingness of the husband
to pay, or whether or not the funeral work was done on the credit of
the husband or the estate. Though the estate is primarily liable, yet the
ultimate liability for these expenses rests upon the husband, and, if he
pays them, he cannot recover them.9
In those jurisdictions which hold that the husband is primarily
liable as at common law, reimbursement is denied to the husband where
he has paid such expenses.10
'Rocap v. Blackwell, (Ind.) 137 N.E. 726; In re Skillnan's Estate, 146 Ia.
6ol, 125 N.W. 343.
8 Constantinides v. Walsh, 146 Mass. 281, 15 N.E. 631; Moulton v. Smith, 16
R.I. 126; 12 Atl. 891; In re Skillnan, 146 Ia. 6ol, 125 N.W. 343; Smith v. Eichner, 124 Wash. 575, 215 P. 27; McClellan v. Filson, (Ohio) 5 N.E. 861; see also
Hatton v. Ciningham, 162 N.Y. Supp. ioo8, accord.
'Rocap v. Blackwell, (Ind.) 137 N.E. 726; Phillips v. Tribbey, (Ind.) 141
N.E. 262; see also Pariser v. Pasteelinck, (N.J.) 112 A. 186; Hall v. Stewart,
(Va.) 116 S.E. 469.
o Carpenter v. Hazelrigg, 103 Ky. 538, 45 S.W. 666; Galloway v. McPherson,
67 Mich. 546, 35 N.W. 114; Brezzo v. Brangero, (Cal.) 196 P. 87; Hall v.
Stewart, (Va.) 116 S.E. 469; Kenyon v. Brightwell, (Ga.) 48 S.E. 124; Sliyley
v. Reese, 53 Alt. 89, 25 Am. Rep. 598; Staple's Appeal, 52 Conn. 425.
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The question of reimbursement for the payment b3y the husband for
the expenses of the last illness of the wife stands upon a different footing. As above stated the presumption is that funeral expenses are incurred, under the statutes, on the credit of the estate, while medical
attendance and other services are ordinarily procured on the credit of
a living person, namely, the husband, and which the wife or her estate
has no duty to pay. Hence the overwhelming weight of authority is
that the husband cannot have reimbursement from the separate estate
of the deceased wife for medical expenses paid by him."1
The precise question of whether an implied promise arises on the
part of the administrator of the wife's separate estate to reimburse a
husband, who has paid his wife's funeral expenses, and'who has paid
the expenses of the last illness of his wife during her lifetime has not,
it seems, been decided in Wisconsin.
2
In the case of Schneider v. Breier,1
an undertaker filed his claim
against the estate of the wife who died intestate, leaving a separate
estate, and who was survived by a husband who had lived with her as
such up to the time of her death. The claim was allowed by the county
court and the allowance affirmed by the circuit court. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court by the administrator.
The main contention of the appellant was that the husband had issued
orders for the funeral arrangements and became primarily liable therefor. But it appeared from the findings of the county court that the
work had been done solely upon the credit of the estate. The Supreme
Court held that under Section 313.16, supra, providing for order of
payment of debts against decedents and their estates, and decisions in
other states under substantially similar statutes, the estate became
primarily liable, and that the claim for funeral expenses was properly
allowed against it without regard to the liability of the husband. The
court, however, stated the case turned upon whether or not the estate
could be primarily liable and expressly reserved the question of whether
the husband would be liable in a proper case. Moreover, the question
of reimbursement was entirely absent from the case.
In the Wisconsin case of Estate of Kelleyy 3 the decedent, at the time
of her death, was an inmate of a sanitarium. The nearest relative of
' 1 Hayes v. Gill. 226 Mass. 388, 115 N.E.

492;

In re Stadtinuller, 96 N.Y. Supp.

iioi; Stonsifer v. Shriver, ioo Md. 24, 59 Atl. 139; Moulton v. Smith, 16 R.I.
126, 12 Atl. 139; Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 KY. 7, 141 S.W. 409; Hall v. Stewart,
(Va.) 116 S.E. 469; Brezzo v. Brazgero. (Cal.) 196 Pac. 87.
Contra: In re Skilhnian's Estate, 146 Ia. 6or, 125 N.W. 343 (influenced by
local statute) ; Smith v. Eichner, 124 Wash. 575, 215 P. 27; McClellaa v. Filson,

44 Ohio 185, 5 N.E. 861.
"129 Wis. 446, IO9 N.W. 99.
is 183 Wis. 485, i9o N.W. 280.
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deceased, upon being notified of the death by the proper officials, requested appellants to perform the services of burial. Appellants omitted
to file a claim therefor against decedent's estate within the time limited
for creditors by the county court. The executrix objected to its allowance (I) that the claim was barred, (2) that the relative who had
ordered the services became personally liable therefor. The court held
that (i) a claim for funeral expenses is not a claim against a deceased
person, and is not barred because not filed within the time limited for
creditors; (2) the relative was not an officious intermeddler, and in the
absence of evidence that the relative became personally liable to the
undertaker, the estate was chargeable with the expenses of burial.
In view of strong expressions and decisions in this state upon the
duty of the husband to support, nurse and care for his wife, it would
not seem certain whether in this state a husband who is solvent and has
paid the funeral and medical expenses could have reimbursement therefor.
In Ryan v. Dockery, 4 it was held that the law requires a husband to
support, care for, and provide comforts for his wife in sickness as well
as in health, and that the husband cannot shirk such duty, even by contract with his wife.
In First National Bank v. Jahn, 5 it was said that the purpose of
section 6.o156 granting to women the same rights and privileges as men
in freedom of contract was to remove the limitations imposed by the
common law upon married women but at the same time to leave them
with such protection as the law had hitherto afforded them. The disabilities of married women at common law were removed but the rights
and privileges of the wife as such were preserved to her.
Although in the case of Schneider v. Breier's Estate, supra, it was
held that the provisions of section 313.16, supra, making the estate
of a married woman primarily liable for her funeral expenses, were not
ith sections 246.02 and 246.03, supra, providing that the
in conflict W*
separate estate of the wife shall not be subject to debts exclusively those
of the husband, yet it would appear that medical expenses furnished the
wife in her last illness would be, under the rule of Ryan v. Dockery,
supra, such an exclusive debt of the husband that it could not be
charged against her separate estate where the husband is solvent.
Moreover, it would seem that the case of Schneider v. Breier's Estate,
supra, does not militate against an intention on the part of the legislature by the enactment of section 313.16, supra, to make the executor
or administrator primarily liable for payment of funeral charges in his
1

134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820.
179 Wis. 117, 19o N.W. 82z.
Wis. Stats., 1925.
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representative capacity without changing the liability of the husband.
Decisions following Constanttmides v. Walsh, supra,allowing reimbursement to the husband, were decided on the theory that the passage of
Married Women's Act was a relaxation of the duties and liabilities of
the husband. The strong utterances of our Supreme Court that a
husband cannot shirk or get rid of his duties as such would seem to
negative that, in this state, an implied promise arises on the part of
the administrator to reimburse him, since the husband has done only
that which he in law was bound to do. The rule of Ryan v Dockery,
supra, in conjunction with the expressions of our Supreme Court in
First National Bank v. Jahn, supra, leaves mooted the question of
whether in this state, as against the separate estate of the wife the common law duty of the husband to pay for the funeral expenses of his
wife has become one of secondary liability

